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Abstract
Background: For the development of a sustainable energy system, the public’s contribution to the sustainment of
the system’s current operations will become vital. The public’s role is expected to change from that of passive service
abiders to active service providers, as anticipated by visions of prosumers, smart grids, demand side management, virtual
power plants, and electric vehicle management. Smart technology and new business models will increase system
complexity and the experience of uncertainty and risk for all parties. Actionability of the public’s participation in
the opportunities arising from the transformation of energy systems will become a problem.
Methods: With a qualitative functionalist method, we analyze the prerequisites of the public’s participation: the
capacity of social mechanisms, such as trust, for the solution of social problems. Functional problems affect the
continuation of communication, i.e., the possibility of the sustainment of social reality. We isolate three case
studies that illustrate concrete effects of trust, distrust, and confidence on three parties, respectively: consumers,
investors, and those affected by grid extensions.
Results and conclusions: We argue that the social mechanisms of trust and confidence are more vital for consumers,
investors, and those affected than previous research has noticed. These mechanisms determine the achievement of
sustainability in energy systems by sustaining actionability as a favorable expectation (trust, confidence), or an
unfavorable expectation (lack of trust, distrust). Even lack of trust and distrust can be valuable contributors on the
road to sustainability, since they uncover flaws and setbacks of a fledgling smart grid.
Keywords: Smart grid, Complexity, Acceptance, Uncertainty, Risk, Prosumer, Consumers, Investors, Those affected,
Decision-making
Background
The transformation of energy systems (ES) into smart
grids—particularly in the domain of electricity—is not
only a matter of technological proficiency. In fact, the
far-reaching objectives and visions of systemic transform-
ation require major qualitative changes in the relationship
between the public and the ES [1–3]. “Smart” technologies
and behavior, like smart grids, smart markets, or demand
side management (DSM), are supposed to support the im-
plementation of multiple alternative energy sources, in
order to increase efficiency and sustainability of the
provision, distribution, and consumption of energy.1 From
the systems perspective, the potential of technological de-
velopments cannot be exploited without the public’s
active participation: “Consumers represent a cornerstone
in the fulfillment of goals such as energy efficiency and
savings, by their active participation through their actual
utilization of the system” [4].
Proponents of smart grids assume that the public will
adapt to the new technological reality once the opportun-
ities become clear. Scientists, politicians, and economists
call on the ability of potential users to rationally calculate
risks and chances.2 To expose, analyze, and assess the
consequences of these underlying premises is the motiv-
ation of our investigation. They rest on nothing less than
the broad-scale modification of public attitudes toward
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– New technical devices which are “intelligent,
self-healing, autonomous machines” [5–7], into
whose operation the majority of the public has no
insight [8]
– Opaque markets in which rules of fairness cannot be
enforced for certain, as it is unclear “who reaps the
benefits, who bears the risks and burdens” [9]
– The complex of public administration and
governmental agencies, which supervise the
development of smart infrastructures, and on
which the public has to rely [10–12]
The implementation of these changes will not be
straightforward. In general, social scientists assume that
the major obstacle for the implementation of a new
technology is social acceptance. In the last decade, we
have seen extended research on the matter of acceptance
and energy system transformation: general assessments
of regional situations like the USA [9]; the differentiation
of dimensions of acceptance (socio-political, community,
or market [13] dimensions); acceptance of institutional
frameworks like socio-economic conditions or the con-
sequences of innovation [14]; investigations of criteria
determining acceptance (including criteria like community
ownership [15], participatory exercises [16], perceived just-
ice in planning procedures [17], values associated with large
technical systems [18]); and many case studies on wind
energy in general and offshore wind, smart grids, transmis-
sion lines, etc. However, this branch of research—just like
most research on socio-technical systems—investigates
causes for the achievement or non-achievement of posi-
tively valued developments and outputs (like public support
for new technologies in particular and the ES transform-
ation in general [19]); it investigates goal attainment follow-
ing specific quotas of renewable energy or improvements
to the ES concerning greater customer orientation or more
sustainable, ethical, and effective developments [20]. In this
sense, lack of acceptance is conceptualized mainly as a def-
icit that has to be overcome through educating the public,
and it is assumed that once education is achieved, the
related problems will probably vanish.
Contrary to the belief in promoting the public’s under-
standing of science, everyday social life needs a “reduc-
tion of complexity” [21] to get things done; it needs
“voluntary blindness.” A “large measure of trust is neces-
sary if we are to cooperate, manage the uncertainties
and confront the risks of working towards a sustainable
energy future” [22]. In truth, acceptance does not neces-
sarily lead to the active involvement of persons; it may
just result in passive tolerance.
As an alternative to deficit models (lack of acceptance
or trust) and factor theories (causes for acceptance or trust),
we introduce the application of functionalist methods [23]
to the specific case of smart grid technologies for future
energy provision. We are searching for the social conditions
which render unlikely commitments likely. This search does
not imply any evaluation of the outcome of such com-
mitments. Rather, the application of this method should
provide a deeper understanding of the underlying pro-
blem—free of preconception—before discussing policy
options.
The alternative concept to acceptance is that of the re-
lation of trust and confidence. Trust is a mechanism of
complexity reduction, because it enables action in spite
of uncertainty about the future [21, 24–26]. As a conse-
quence, trust helps execute actions that would otherwise
not have been effective [21], and it builds a foundation
for the implementation of action potential [27]. Confi-
dence is a behavior which is complementary to trust,
and it is directed at abstract entities like infrastructures,
politics in general, or markets. Given the need to reduce
complexity and to absorb uncertainty, we assume that
trust in systems and their respective decision programs,
as well as confidence in the overall transformation of the
systems, are necessary preconditions for actionability.3
Moreover, we argue that trust and confidence are
interdependent. They systematically reinforce one another,
and only if a certain threshold of trust and confidence is
reached will people commit themselves to actively partici-
pate in the transformation process. Lack of trust may en-
force a passive behavior; distrust may enforce autonomy,
or the search for alternatives. These patterns are visible in
energy-related roles such as consumers, investors, and
those affected by grid extension.
Trust and confidence address specific functional prob-
lems which arise in socio-technical constellations like the
ES. The task of this paper is to investigate what socio-
technical problems can be identified (“Socio-technical
problems” section) and how social mechanisms like trust
and confidence contribute to their solutions—without
claiming that those solutions are genuinely positive for the
overall development of future energy provision or society
as a whole. We have to bear in mind that overconfidence
and blind trust may be as damaging as the lack of trust.
Methods
Accordingly, this paper will present a sociological discus-
sion on social mechanisms to cope with the increasing de-
gree of complexity resulting from the ES transformation.
For this purpose, theoretical arguments from sociological
approaches, addressing functional problems of control,
change, and actionability, will be combined with empirical
insights. The empirical data has been extracted from 90 to
120 min, semi-standardized interviews conducted with
eight leading experts from various branches of the
German energy sector. They include major technology
companies, transmission service operators, federal and local
business associations, and consumer and environmental
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associations.4 The narratives of these experts, combined
with extensive document reviews, provide the main source
for our descriptions of the German ES visions. Moreover,
they guided our research toward the inclusion of complex-
ity and the resulting challenges in the three case studies. All
in all—referring to the functionalist method—we follow
one of the leading methodical guidelines of technology
assessment: to expose the premises of prospective technol-
ogy programs, to analyze their secondary problems, and to
bring all societal consequences to full display.
For a more thorough understanding of the societal di-
mension of ES transformation, we will expose structural,
institutional, and operational problems (“Socio-technical
problems” section). We will discuss how, on the oper-
ational level, problems of acting and decision-making
under uncertainty have their roots in trust, lack of trust,
or distrust. To illustrate the plausibility of our theoret-
ical arguments and to illustrate concrete challenges, we
explore trust issues in the German energy sector (“Trust
and distrust as drivers of stability and change in ES
transformation” section). Three case studies will be laid
out, with consideration of the different situations which
the public finds itself in, already, and more so in the fu-
ture: consumers, investors, and those affected (“Results:
three case studies about smart grids—consumers, inves-
tors, and those affected” section). Finally, we will discuss
briefly how the existing “architecture of trust” may be
modified and what consequences this can have on the
development toward sustainability (“Discussion: an
“architecture of trust” for ES” section).
Socio-technical problems
The ES interrelates technical and social processes to
solve specific problems, in order to provide expected
outputs. Prevailing research on socio-technical systems
emphasizes either structural aspects or institutional as-
pects. While these aspects are crucial, we will also draw
attention to operational aspects, thereby dealing with
problems of action and decision-making. Since every
socio-technical system poses a “linked series of socio-
technical problems” [28], we propose that socio-technical
systems are expectation complexes of services (institutional
aspect), to which technical and social systems contribute
(structural aspect), to solve from moment-to-moment
socio-technical problems (operational aspect). We will dis-
cuss structural and institutional changes which lead to
complexity. Complexity results in the anticipation of
contingency, which itself results in decision-uncertainty
and risk. Problems of actionability concern—mainly but
not exclusively—the operational dimension. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss socio-technical problems and why
trust and confidence are requisite social mechanisms for
the development of future smart energy infrastructures.
Structure and control
Previous research on the emergence of socio-technical
systems [29, 30], on the governance of large technical sys-
tems [31, 32], or on socio-technical infrastructure systems
[28, 33, 34] analyzes the emergent qualities of entities
wherein social and technical elements interrelate. It con-
ceives of socio-technical systems as open systems or net-
works of heterogeneous elements, held together by a
purpose: that of providing energy, transportation, water,
or worldwide data exchange. It assumes that technical
operations and social actions are functionally complemen-
tary [35, 36], and it focuses on antagonistic developments,
stress, or breaches. Usually, one finds exogenous (environ-
mental) or endogenous (systematic) factors triggering
changes of the system’s characteristics, which then influ-
ence the quality of the infrastructure service [37]. This
makes future states or behavior of systems harder to pre-
dict (indeterminateness).
Concepts of socio-technical systems highlight the mul-
tiple, varying relations between heterogeneous elements,
indicating a high level of “organized complexity” [38]. For
the German ES Transformation, complexity is all-
embracing: Different types of power plants (for conven-
tional and renewable energy sources) are connected to the
network with transmission lines, distribution grids, and
smart devices which contribute to the service of the ES.
Moreover, different actors of the ES (administrative bodies,
companies, communities, groups, and private persons) are
interrelated through rules, contracts and markets, and reg-
ulations [33]. Control of such interwoven networks
becomes vital.
Experts already face multiple challenges due to the
changing structure of infrastructure systems; they are
particularly challenged by the “complexity of these sys-
tems and the related emergent behaviors which may
arise in collective ways, difficult to predict from the
superposition of the behavior of the individual elements
of the system” [39]. Given that the visionaries of smart
grids propose even more integration of Information and
Communications Technology (ICT), the problem of
non-knowledge about the behavior of smart grids may
progressively become the most significant issue for all
involved, for operators, supervisors, investors, “prosumers”,
and citizens [40].
Institutions and change
Several concepts concerned with socio-technical systems
accord an important role to institutions [41] and to pro-
cesses of institutionalization [36, 42]. Recently, transition
research has invoked the structural and institutional fea-
tures of socio-technical systems with crucial infrastructure
(such as energy, water, railroads, and telecommunications).
A very prominent feature of transition research is the ana-
lysis of the relations of stability (configuration, structure,
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and institution) and of change (co-evolution, structuration,
and institutionalization). Within the framework of transi-
tion research, the multi-level perspective addresses socio-
technical transition as a function of stability and change
caused on three analytically distinct levels: regime, niche,
and landscape. The regime is the dominant structure
within a socio-technical system. In a regime, a multitude of
actors and organizations is tightly interwoven into a net-
work of mutual dependencies held together through for-
mal and informal relations, e.g., through contracts and
trust (respectively). The regime determines social relations
by virtue of institutionalized expectations, such as cog-
nitive rules of scientific observation, agreed upon
knowledge, established technical paradigms, and belief
systems [35, 36]. In abstract terms, institutions entail
that not every event, action, or decision is similarly pos-
sible, legitimate, or probable. Structures and institutions
are necessary features of social life to provide orientation
and to enable action.
The energy infrastructure in Germany is a highly regu-
lated complex, with strongly institutionalized networks
of incumbent actors, but it is now in flux because of the
German ES Transformation. This transformation is
executed as a real-time experiment of a socio-technical
nature, comprising experiments with technical and
social aspects (e.g., regulations or consumer behavior).
“Research on energy has increasingly turned society
into a laboratory – one in which the energy user and
non-scientist can potentially play an active part in the
experiment” [40]. To control such a transformation, a
balance between tight experiment-reality couplings
(which enables innovative, realistic, close-to-the-market
benefits) and loose couplings (which disturb the system’s
operation as little as possible) is required. To foster social
change, one needs to sustain action orientation with stable
generalized expectations, while increasing learning capaci-
ties with less “resilient” institutions [43]. Nonetheless, due
to the inevitable non-knowledge about the success of the
German ES Transformation, the public may be opposed
to a learning experience, and such opposition will, pre-
sumably, prevent their active involvement [40].
Operation and intransparency
The problems of control and change affect the operational
dimension of the ES. Social operations include acting and
decision-making. In socio-technical systems, operations
are conditioned by technical determinism (1) and social
dynamics (2). These are very distinct modi operandi.
1. In this paper, we refer to a technical operation on a
physical, chemical, or biological basis, as a “functioning
simplification in the medium of causality” [44]. In the
sense of causal determination of technical operations,
technology exonerates from contingency—if it works.
One does not need to know how technical devices
operate, but with some experience, one can expect a
certain output on a regular basis. This idea can be
illustrated with the expression “trivial machine,”
coined by Heinz von Foerster [45]. Trivial machines
are those machines which use a set of rules in order to
transform certain facts into other facts (for example,
heat from combustion of coal boils water in a boiler to
produce steam, which expands across a number of
blades in a turbine, leading to rotation and,
subsequently, to the generation of electricity).
“Non-trivial machines,” on the contrary, change the
rules on how certain facts are transformed into
other facts of their own accord.5 Therefore, we
understand technology in connection with
regularity of behavior; provided a machine
functions, it will operate in accordance with the
actors’ stable expectations of what will happen
when the machines operates.6
2. We refer to a social operation as communication
(the basic operational element of social systems)
based on meaning. Unlike technical operations,
social operations entail the possibility of surprise.
Successful communication is, first and foremost,
unlikely. The synthesis of a threefold selection of
information, utterance, and understanding constitutes
communication. Selectivity implies the potential to
surprise in every situation anew: People are always free
to say “yes” or “no” to any kind of communication
offer. Paradigmatically, this problem has been
addressed by concepts emphasizing that social
interaction is a precarious affair because of the
freedom other actors possess. The social condition for
collective actions, i.e., cooperative behavior (as pointed
out by rational choice theory), is one important
concept here [46]; the “problem of double
contingency” is another [47].
From a functional perspective, sociological theory seeks
to explain why all the occurrences we take for granted,
because we observe them on a regular basis, are happening
despite their indeterminateness (contingency, uncertainty,
risk). Unlike technical operations and routinized, quasi-
automatic action, social realities emerge when actors relate
to each other via communication and when the threefold
selection of information, utterance, and understanding cre-
ates meaningful distinctions which link communication to
an identifiable unit (a social system) distinct from all other
events (in the system’s environment). “Such a model allows
for a complex interplay of what information is being trans-
ferred, how it is transferred (whether intended or not), and
then how it is received (which itself reinstitutes the com-
municative process by re-conceptualizing information)”
[48]. Social realities have to solve problems of contingency,
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e.g., the surprise of unexpected events, so that structures
and institutions can emerge and sustain themselves.
Norms, rules, routines, values, etc., are contingent in their
origins, but once they are established, they offer stable ex-
pectations. However, communication, as the basic element
of social systems, always inherits the moment of surprise.
Every social situation is comprised of events which bring
about a new combination of determinacy and indetermin-
acy [47]—which is (or should) not be the case for technolo-
gy—where only determinacy is in order.
Structural coupling of technology and communication
Since there is a sharp distinction between technical op-
erations and social operations, the interrelations of the
socio-technical should not be approached in terms of
functional equivalency (like in the metaphor of the
“seamless web”) but in terms of structural coupling. A
structural coupling implies that while technology is a
topic of (or stimulates) communication, it does not deter-
mine, overlay, or substitute communication, because the
type of operation is distinct: “The technical network of
energy flow is completely neutral to communication; in
other words, information is produced outside the network
[…]. Causal relations between technological physics and
communicated information are freed of overlap and take
the form of structural coupling” [49].
The case of ICT illustrates this structural coupling
clearly, for in spite of tremendous developments (speed,
volume, and accessibility) in electronic data processing,
social actors remain dependent on interpretation and
choice in order to exploit the technological capacities.
The information value of electronic data processing is
determined by the processing of meaning by psychic or
social systems. Actors are confronted with an enormous
asymmetry between the visible, symbolic tokens on the
interface of a system and the machines lying hidden
behind the interface. Behind it are these programmed
and trivial, but very complicated, machines which exe-
cute algorithms that greatly exceed the data processing
capacities of human cognition. “Although they [computers]
are manufactured and programmed machines, such com-
puters function intransparently for consciousness and
communication through structural couplings. Strictly
speaking they are invisible machines” [49]. The structural
coupling of technical and social realities produces both re-
lief and new forms of stress. Unless uncertainty is absorbed
by social mechanisms like trust and confidence, actionabil-
ity cannot be sustained (Table 1).
Trust and distrust as drivers of stability and
change in ES transformation
In the operational dimension of socio-technical systems,
trust is a prototypical problem concerned largely with
time. Similarly, in Simmel’s “philosophy of money,” trust
implies a “quasi-religious faith” which is required to cope
with non-knowledge of the future [50, 51]. Trust em-
powers persons to “act as if the future was certain” [21].
Recent research on “process views of trusting” [52] high-
lights the temporal dimension of trust. Trust and time are
long-standing relatives. When building stable expectations
of future developments, people have to commit them-
selves to a “leap of faith” [51], and this leap has become a
focal point for research on trust.
According to Lewis and Weigert ([53], p. 25), the most
"forceful" theoretical advances on conceptualizing trust
in the past decades have been conducted by Möllering
[26, 51, 54]. Möllering refers to Simmel’s leap as the act
of “suspending irreducible social vulnerability and uncer-
tainty as if they were favourably resolved” ([54], p. 356).
This theory on the act of “suspension,” which is largely
shared in the international research community, tries to
account for the irrationality of trust that upholds favorable
expectations even in the face of possible disappoint-
ment—the perception of risk [55]. In particular, this inter-
disciplinary approach attempts to conceptualize trust in a
more holistic fashion than single disciplines—such as eco-
nomics. It identifies the core of the trust problem in the
irreducibility of uncertainty (as quoted above). This corre-
sponds to the functionalist view of upholding actionability
through trusting.
Comparing his own approach with game theory
models of trust and comparable rational choice con-
cepts, Möllering ([54], p. 356) explains that “The need
to find alternative explanations is evident, because ra-
tionalistic explanations regularly face the paradox that
they are either explaining trust away or explaining
everything but trust.” In this way, rational choice
models of trust usually refer to measurability, or cer-
tainty, or cost versus benefit analyses. Yet these aspects
are only one part of what trust is concerned with; they
are merely concerned with reason ([54], p. 357). As a
result of this limited view, game theorists who are
Table 1 Three dimensions of socio-technical problems
Dimension Socio-technical problems Solutions
Stability Change
Structure Control of system performance, security Complexity Governance
Institution General orientation, reliable outputs Surprise Experiments, learning
Operation Actionability, participation Intransparency Confidence, trust
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concerned with trust suffer from the assumption that it
is knowledge or complete information that arouses
trust or distrust. Möllering, on the contrary, alludes to
the role of non-knowledge—absorbing uncertainty and
risk—as a central variable in the trust process. Even in
promising research on “the role of trust in the transition
to sustainable energy” [22], the capacity of rational
choice and other fledgling trust concepts is over-
stretched in that “all are based on a common founda-
tion: trust is a feeling or belief that someone (or some
institution) will act in your best interest” ([22], p. 2615).
Not only is the crucial element of suspension—the core
of studying trust—missing in this definition; moreover,
this definition limits the possible references of trust to
micro-scale units such as “someone (or some institu-
tion).” In contrast, the approach presented in this paper
relies on trust and confidence in abstract systems in a
very specific manner [55, 56] that we will further unfold
in the following sections.
While trust is already significant in many areas of the
energy sector (e.g., investment decisions, market transac-
tions, power plant and network operations), it will prob-
ably become even more important in future constellations,
if the public’s inclusion is required. The transformation of
an ES cannot happen thus unless all actors modify their
attitudes (or adopt new ones) with respect to new tech-
nologies, regulatory frameworks, and market opportunities.
Such a transformation of attitude cannot happen through
personal relationships; instead, trust in abstract systems is
required [56]. Everyone affected by the transformation of
the ES is forced to evaluate if the changing system will per-
form as expected. The function of trust is to enable en-
gaging in new forms of interaction, which the system will
offer as arising opportunities. However, evaluation must
happen prior to monitoring whether the desired out-
comes materialize. Therefore, the problem of intran-
sparency is not only characterized by the trust
addressees’ degrees of freedom or the possibility of
technical failure. Foremost, we should consider the ne-
cessity to momentarily close the temporal gap to an
open future by a “leap of faith” [26, 50]. Trust is the
grease which softens the frictions of constant rational
calculation on what can “go wrong.”
Trust is intrinsically interwoven in the sustainment of
present operations:
Trust can only be secured and maintained in the
present. Neither the uncertain future nor even the past
can arouse trust since that which has been does not
eliminate the possibility of the future discovery of
alternative antecedents. […] The basis of all trust is the
present as an unbroken continuum of changing events,
as the totality of states in respect to which events can
occur [21]
Analyses of system transformation hinge on the tem-
poral horizon chosen; e.g., German scenarios of possible
energy generation and consumption paths and respective
addressees of trust vary according to whether they concern
the next year, the next 5 years, or the next 30 years. Visions
of potential smart grid components concern its final state,
which is temporally located far away, at approximately
2050, according to the federal government [1]. Hence en-
ergy practitioners describe some envisioned components,
such as virtual power plants, as “fantasies.”7 The following
section discusses visions of future ES, particularly the
German ES Transformation ("Smart grids" section). Then,
the concept of trust will be clarified further ("Familiarity,
confidence, and trust in complex systems" section) and
the reader will discover three pivotal trust challenges for
smart grids ("Results: three case studies about smart
grids—consumers, investors, and those affected" section).
Smart grids
The German ES Transformation is largely a development
toward a smart grid. Nearly every significant political party
refers to smart grid development, while the government
funds large-scale testing with smart grid components, such
as “E-Energy” [2], and promotes the development of an
“Internet of Energy” [57]. Although a smart grid (under-
stood as a mere effectuation of energy consumption) is
conceivable without a large integration of renewable en-
ergy sources (RES), the German ES Transformation relies
on innovations in this area to mitigate ensuing volatilities.
The smart grid cannot function successfully without
“appropriate” smart meter usage and economic activity,
as determined in prevalent visions. Hence, the success of
the smart grid is very dependent on the behavioral con-
formity of prosumers, because actions (trust), the absence
of actions (lack of trust), and counteractions (distrust) of
individual smart meter users and small-scale electricity
vendors in emerging energy markets may have significant
cumulative effects on the overall rationality—and there-
fore success—of the ES. We assess the relevance of trust
as a social mechanism in terms of its impact as an action-
enabling mechanism for electricity consumers confronted
with unfamiliar complexity and facing unprecedented
decision-making and reflexivity in smart grids [58]. We
emphasize the consequences of trust in the sense that a
given action (smart meter usage, economic activity) actu-
ally will occur, or remain absent, because of a lack of trust.
These expectations imply a qualitative change in the
underlying prerogatives of the energy sector. An active trust
in technology (smart meters), markets (reputation manage-
ment, sanction systems), and organizations (supervision,
trust intermediaries) will become indispensable for the pro-
spective ES to work, given the critical role of decentralized
consumption and feed-in units for system performance.
Mere acceptance of infrastructure plays a smaller role.
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Hence, the German ES is moving toward a smart grid
model based upon large-scale consumer involvement8
(c.f. how four out of five smart grid components affect
the average electricity customer (Table 2)). Since this
transformation will probably be most significant for the
average, private consumers, this paper focuses primarily
on their broad household usage.
Familiarity, confidence, and trust in complex systems
Even though past ES were technically complicated [39],
electricity consumption was quite simple and rarely led,
in the OECD world, to users’ disappointment in the reli-
ability of an ES. In Germany, which possesses a particularly
reliable power grid, an uninterrupted electricity supply is
expected, and consumers have built a high degree of famil-
iarity in interacting with electricity services. Familiarity in-
dicates a low level of risk reflection on technology
interaction 9 and a high level of confidence, thus resulting
in a very routine mode of interaction. When consumers’
positive experiences with technological services are con-
stantly reaffirmed, familiarity and stable expectations are
built, which can eventually obscure huge technological
infrastructure systems in an unnoticeable latency [28]. Al-
though confidence is related to trust, it is not bound to
decision-making, because disappointments in confidence
are attributed to external factors rather than to one’s own
decisions [55].
Like trust, distrust is an action-enabling strategy. Distrust
is not the opposite of trust, but its functional equivalent.
Distrust reduces complexity into a narrow action corridor
by making a few actions probable and certain others highly
unlikely [21]. Distrust provokes counterstrategies by con-
sumers who wish to circumvent the distrusted situation or
object, thus aspiring autonomy, searching for alternatives
and perhaps even boycotting. Unlike a lack of trust, which
can hinder action, distrust results in a mobilization of
action potential.
In the past, consumers could afford to distrust both the
regime operating the ES and its technology (e.g., nuclear
plants) without causing an overarching, systemic conse-
quence.10 Since smart grids depend on the behavior of sin-
gle users, they are more vulnerable to cumulated effects of
massive simultaneous action—and such action can fall out-
side the expected behavioral patterns. As large technical
systems become interactive technical systems with direct
consumer involvement through ICT and market participa-
tion, the systems’ invisibility will dissolve. Smart grids will
contain far more “access points,” i.e., intersections (smart
meters, market organizations, electric vehicles) where con-
sumers can do “facework” [56] with the impersonal ES.
This increases the system’s complexity and the potential
for uncertainty and incalculable consumer action, reinfor-
cing the system’s foundation on trust instead of control.
In the German ES Transformation, complexity is an issue
in its own right, depicted by experts as the central challenge
which they face. Our interviewees explicitly stated that the
complexity has a direct bearing on their work. They
claimed that a high proportion of non-knowledge exists
and pointed out the fragility of interdisciplinary knowledge
between engineering (energy technology), computer science
(grid communication), and social science (consumer
behavior). They portrayed the German ES Transform-
ation as a large real-time experiment rather than a
planned project—an appraisal which substantiates the
impact of complexity.
Results: three case studies about smart
grids—consumers, investors, and those affected
As trust reduces complexity and thus enables action
under future uncertainty, trust unfolds its vital effect in
the face of non-knowledge and becomes manifest in the
risk-taking act [59]. We shall illustrate, with case studies
about smart grid actors, the growing need for distrust,
and trust as a “certainty equivalent” [21], to manage rising
degrees of contingency, uncertainty, and risk, particularly
from a consumer perspective.
Consumers
Electricity has been available to consumers as a quasi-
invisible force [58] and, for decades, as an unquestioned
resource [60]. The currently passive consumption will in-
creasingly become a matter of liability and daily attention,
as the organization of generation, transport, and distribu-
tion of electricity is transformed. For the integration of
volatile RES, “smart technology” is envisioned to help align
consummation during phases of low or high RES output.
Proponents of “smart meters” claim that customers can be
encouraged to save energy (because smart meters offer
transparency about quantity and costs), while operators
can monitor and control appliances of customers (because
smart meters provide data, identity, and location of home
appliances), and control their maximum load demand dur-
ing peak load (because supply can be disconnected via
smart meter if customers exceed their quotas) [61].
According to the technical premises of dominating vi-
sions, “smart technology” not only results in more efficient
use of energy, it will also provide “grid-supportive” mea-
sures and thereby help maintain grid stability and security
of supply [2, 62].
In sharp contrast to the traditional supply-driven con-
sumption, smart grids require consumers who actively
Table 2 Five components of smart grids [7]
Domains of smart energy technology
DSM Virtual power
plants
Electric vehicle
management
Energy
prosumers
Self-healing
networks
From left to right: ICT, increasing connectivity/communication, (distributive)
grid extension, decentralization, implementation of “artificial intelligence”
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adapt their consumption behavior through smart meters
allowing for DSM, new tariff systems, mobile applications,
etc. Consumers may decide to use electrical appliances
(e.g., heat pumps, air-conditioning, and washing machines)
and discharge vehicle batteries to the grid only at deter-
mined times, responding to signals securing the demand-
supply equilibrium [2, 7, 63].
As choice always involves uncertainty, consumers’ deci-
sions expose the system to trust and distrust vulnerabil-
ities. A basic choice consists in whether to comply with
the expectations of engineers, operators, and/or supervi-
sors. Consumers may reject the effort of rational calcula-
tion: They may not gain familiarity and fail to gather
information by comparing possibilities and prices; they
may reject the delegation of control to machines, opera-
tors, and supervisors. Yet delegating one’s power to make
decisions, even partially (e.g., to software agents in smart
meter appliances), is itself a decision.
With a view to encouraging consumers’ compliance,
psychologists research the regulation of incentives (e.g.,
online platforms, price signaling, and smart meter setup).
In many European countries [3], including Germany
(E-Energy projects [2]), large-scale regulatory experi-
ments are carried out. The fact that incentives are heav-
ily researched is a strong indicator for the social
instability caused by the freedom of choice which con-
sumers are likely to have. Therefore, incentive mechanisms
also create risk. Incentives can fail and lead collective con-
sumer behavior into unanticipated directions. If consumer
behavior becomes a critical factor for system operation,
then the risk of cumulated effects (like collective distrust
against the new grid or parts of it) will rise. During the ini-
tial phases of transition in the Netherlands and California
(USA), distrust was manifested by protest against the
installation of smart meters [4, 12].11
In 2011, the US Government Accountability Office [64]
concluded in its report on Electricity Grid Modernization
that “consumers are not adequately informed about the
benefits, costs, and risks associated with smart grid sys-
tems.” As smart grids enable the transmission of large
amounts of data about household activity, fear rises about
privacy and customer security with regard to the
unauthorized use or modification of sensitive “personal
data” (that is, recorded data attributed to a person, e.g.,
name, contact, biographical data like individual preferences,
transaction history, or recorded activities), or of informa-
tion derived from such data (including the compilation of
individual profiles or scores) [10]. Some experts anticipate
“nothing short of a paradigm shift in industry from the
current hardware centric focus on system adequacy and re-
liability, towards the inclusion [of] a more directly
consumer-oriented view of security” [11]. However, even if
governments attempt to enforce the implementation of se-
curity standards and the industry promises to incorporate
these standards, the problem of “authenticity” arises as soon
as trust is lacking and the attribution of motives is preva-
lent. The EU commission has mandated the European
Standardization Organization (ESO) to develop security
standards for smart meters. Commercial interests domin-
ate, since the ESO relies on the expertise of commercial
parties. Hoenkamp and Huitema claim that “These
[standards] will be useless if the public rejects them”
([12], p. 5).
The public’s fears could sabotage the envisaged overall
rationality of the system. Comparable “emergent effects”
of cumulative, collective behavior have been observed in
other sectors, such as the rejection of E10 biofuel in
Germany,12 sudden investment withdrawals in the finan-
cial sector [65], and periodic, or even constant, distrust in
the food sector, as with Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia
Coli bacteria (EHEC) in Europe [66] or milk powder in
China.13
Investors
As mentioned above, smart grid visions encompass numer-
ous actors engaged in the energy trade. In some countries
and regions, this process is well under way; particularly,
small and decentralized RES units with self-generated elec-
tricity are increasing in Germany, Denmark, or California
(USA). It is expected that electricity loads will serve self-
supply and assist with grid stability and, moreover, cause
new markets to flourish, so that every actor equipped with
technology for photovoltaics, wind, combined heat and
power, or geothermal applications, etc., can act as an elec-
tricity vendor for “virtual power plants” and “smart mar-
kets” ([2, 7], e.g., [63, 67]).
The desired “prosumers” are expected to consume and
produce electricity simultaneously, making them both
consumers and entrepreneurs. Even at present, such devel-
opments and prospects are significant, as can be illustrated
by Siemens research: The company created a web portal,
with concomitant mobile applications, to explore the po-
tential of virtual power plants in Germany and in European
cross-border conglomerates [68]. Its main objective was to
form stronger power plants that every participant could
benefit from. Therefore, Siemens set up cloud computing
networks between local providers and various electricity
generators who were willing to combine their electricity
loads with those of the other actors. The means to achieve
this were “virtual,” the actors being “plugged” together
through exposition of available load information (kWh,
gigawatt) in the cloud. In this way, virtual power plants
emerge through ICT as a fresh new field of energy
commerce.
Like the global financial system [65], the ES may see
the establishment of rating agencies as “guardians of
trust” which become crucial to the formation of market
networks. According to smart grid visions, institutions
Büscher and Sumpf Energy, Sustainability and Society  (2015) 5:34 Page 8 of 13
which provide recommendations can increase the probabil-
ity of market interaction, by generating a reputation or sig-
naling certain qualities [2, 7, 69]. They can be certification
agencies, market intermediaries, or online platforms.
Since the smart grids’ implementation depends, at least
partly, on consumers’ attitudes, we need to determine the
qualities of these attitudes more precisely. We can deter-
mine these attitudes by using the analytic distinction
between trust and confidence: An actor must, for example,
explicitly trust in the price stability of her chosen supplier’s
electricity, whereas she must implicitly feel confident about
the stability of general market operation, in how responsi-
bilities are allocated, how security of supply is maintained,
and how legal security is guaranteed in the emerging busi-
ness world.
For active prosumers to be endowed with actionability
in this diffuse new system, trustful decision-making can
only be embedded in a climate of general confidence in
(the parts of) the overall system. This interdependence
between confidence and trust can be pictured as a rela-
tion of mutual spirals, where, progressively, one either
reinforces the other (virtuous circle), or one weakens the
other (vicious circle). Together, confidence and trust
determine the future state of the system [55]. In a virtuous
circle, confidence and trust mutually stabilize each other,
creating an atmosphere of business optimism and leading
to a massive exploitation of opportunities in technology
and markets.
The scenario of a vicious circle is particularly relevant
during the mid-term phase of the German ES Trans-
formation. Investment in RES (which may be provided
by small private investors like average consumers, but
also by local providers and larger industries) is crucial
for smart grids to evolve. Business representatives and
scientific experts insist that confidence in a stable legal
framework and financial returns for the investments in
RES in the coming years are necessary. However, some
actors doubt whether these investments are being made,
because uncertainty in the business seems quite acute
(according to an interviewed expert from a business as-
sociation). Certain actors’ distrust extends to skepticism
of the system’s ability to maintain security of supply;
some electricity-intensive companies have even begun
building their own power plants (according to an inter-
viewed expert from academia).
A lack of trust among consumers and investors is not
necessarily a negative development, nor does our discussion
intend to promote some sort of “trust creation” for smart
grid implementation. It may well be that involved actors
are right to distrust—time will show. We merely wish to
point out that the expectations of a majority of smart grid
practitioners, promoters, and stakeholders do not take into
sufficient account the functions and consequences fulfilled
by trust, lack of trust, and distrust (e.g., [1, 3]). Indeed,
distrust can serve an important function of learning and
being conscious and critical of relevant changes in technol-
ogy or policies. Notably, distrust can counter an excessive
accrual of trust, after the equilibrium of trust and distrust
has tipped toward the trust side, adding up to “blind trust”
(which in everyday life we may call “carelessness”).
Those affected
In the foreground of the debate on transforming ES into
smart grids and thereby integrating RES are appeals to
consider the “public acceptance of emerging energy
technologies” [9]. These technologies include smart grid
facilities, grid extensions, and economic or legal measures
that can accompany these technological changes. Most
debates about public acceptance are centered on such
infrastructure issues. Whenever a grid extension is
planned, certain actors must decide on its localization.
These siting choices are often accompanied by protest
and/or resistance movements (“not in my backyard”
problems).14 In Germany, such NIMBY problems are
often dealt with politically, by application of legal
(participatory or planning) procedures. When someone
is exposed to phenomena such as grid extension or
power plant sites near their residential area, they are
affected by decisions taken elsewhere with little or no
own decision-making involved, and thus, they slip into
the role of a “personally affected party” in a technol-
ogy conflict [70].
In Germany, the public debate about siting decisions,
NIMBY problems, and, more generally, contentious
technologies has a long-standing history which has encour-
aged actors and observers (politicians, scientists, business
persons, civil associations, and non-profit organiza-
tions) to declare “acceptance” the social cornerstone of
the German ES Transformation.15
Indeed, acceptance of infrastructures is crucial, as two
projects in Germany exemplify: First, the SuedLink project
is supposed to transport electricity from offshore wind
parks on the northern German coast toward southern
industrial recipients. Planning considers technical and eco-
nomic criteria, as well as objections from those affected by
the project; several participatory exercises have been
implemented. Although initial propositions of the possible
route tried to exclude cities, towns, hospitals, industrial
sites, nature reserves etc., more than 3000 objections have
so far been articulated and publicly discussed.16 Also, plan-
ning is influenced by several elections in the affected states
or municipalities. Political parties openly demand post-
ponement of the project because it interferes with local
electoral campaigns and engenders strong opposition.17
Second is the South-East Direct Current Passage project: it
concerns transmission lines from eastern to southern
Germany. The government claims that energy generated
from RES will be transported; however, at least a significant
Büscher and Sumpf Energy, Sustainability and Society  (2015) 5:34 Page 9 of 13
part of the public does not believe these claims, accusing
the government and the responsible business companies of
intending to build a route for the transportation of coal
electricity, since the route is planned to begin in Saxony-
Anhalt—a brown coal mining area. As protesters remain
outraged about the proposed route to the southern region
of Bavaria, the project had to be put on hold.18
These siting decisions are static and singular: “Static”
indicates an asymmetry in the relationship between the
affected actors and the technology or procedure, for, un-
like the actors, neither the technology nor the procedure
reacts to communication. “Singular” emphasizes the
one-sided character of the decisions: Either one accepts,
or one refuses, the infrastructure—there is no middle
ground. Ordinary spheres of social interaction in the
smart grid, though, require more active participation
than “merely” being affected as outlined above; they require
constant decision-making and decisions are facilitated by
using trust as a social mechanism to reduce complexity.
Even in the extraordinary situation where interaction con-
cerns infrastructure, and where acceptance (understood as
civil tolerance of infrastructure by absence of protest) is the
preponderant form of social coordination, trust still plays
an important role.
The relation between the concepts of trust and accept-
ance has not been clarified sufficiently by the social sci-
ences. Yet with reference to Kohring [71], one could
identify the very foundation of technology acceptance in
strategies of attributing trust. With regard to the case of
the German ES Transformation, one can draw two con-
clusions on the interplay of trust and acceptance: Firstly,
as acceptance allows actors to primarily accept shared
rules on (legal) proceedings in the place of shared out-
comes [72], trust is the mechanism which compensates
for this lack of factual knowledge. Since attending actual
decision-making processes is reserved to elected politi-
cians, trusting that a decision was taken based on solid
reasoning and a competent assessment of the future is
simplified by accepting that the decision to accomplish
the German ES Transformation has been reached through
a politically legitimate procedure. The fact of not-knowing
the exact manner in which the decision has been reached
is bridged by trust, provided one “accepts” the set of rules
according to which the decision has been negotiated. In
this way, siting decisions and NIMBY problems, as pri-
mary examples of acceptance conflicts, are always accom-
panied by trust in legal (decision-making, participatory,
and planning) procedures.
Moreover, a functional shift of acceptance in the German
ES Transformation case can be expected: In earlier periods
of ES development, acceptance issues limited to particular
region proceedings (e.g., in a certain federal state) were a
cause in their own right. Today, the German ES Trans-
formation is observed by the entire nation, and the public’s
observation of regional acceptance can serve as an indi-
cator of system trust building. To be more precise, the
degree of confidence can be associated with a public ob-
servation of (successful or failing) acceptance creation
in regions where grid extensions actually take place and
must be dealt with by personally affected fellow
citizens.
From a temporal perspective, these developments indi-
cate that (i) processes of being affected and investing trust
in procedures mainly occur during current grid extension
projects; (ii) from a mid-term perspective, these processes
occur along the transformation period; and (iii) in the
smart grid of the far future, the significance of genuine
acceptance phenomena concerning physical infrastructures
is likely to vanish.
Discussion: an “architecture of trust” for ES
Over time, consumers, investors, and other stakeholders’
attitudes toward the ES have coalesced into expectations
which are—and will continue to be—challenged. These
expectations are meanwhile inherent to the structures
and institutions of the ES; it shapes their manifestation,
impact, and degrees of stability and change. The extent
and manner in which elements of a system can relate to
each other are built into structures, and, therefore, struc-
tures determine (in technical systems), or condition (in
social systems), the processes of each system. When we
encounter structures, we can develop expectations of
what will happen in the future. Moreover, after a longer
period, we increasingly experience familiarity upon acting
with, or within, structures.
Based on this sense of familiarity, structures support an
architecture of trust [73] within which actors can identify
persons or objects to whom or which they can address
their expectations with respect to the ES (addressees). The
public can identify certain institutions as representatives of
“the energy system,” e.g., energy providers (who maintain
price stability), public agencies for technical supervision
(who ensure security of supply), and sanction agencies
(who enforce regulations) [56]. As addressees, these insti-
tutions represent mutually shared expectations to which
services and outputs are attributed [82], either when reas-
surances about fulfillment of expectations are necessary
(e.g., “electricity supply is safe”) or when disappointments
occur, be they singular or continuous (e.g., “the engineers
will manage/not manage the transition”). Notwithstanding
actors’ familiarity with structures and institutions of the
ES, their expectations are challenged at every moment
in which they deal with the system and its perceived
representatives. Their expectations are continuously
confirmed, negated, or modified in concrete situations
during the operation of the ES. It is this type of sustain-
ment—driven by trust, distrust, and confidence—that
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will crucially determine the potentials of sustainability
in the future system.
For consumers, this means a redirection of familiarity to-
ward either actively trusting and running the risk of being
overconfident or creating collective distrust. Either inves-
tors trust and therefore invest in fledgling smart grid tech-
nology, thus contributing to an investment climate, or
investors lack the confidence to support the ES, given the
instability of legal frameworks. Finally, those personally
affected by spatial planning issues have to accept local
decision-making while, more importantly, investing trust
in planning procedures. For the success of the ES on a
national level, the local settlement of NIMBY conflicts is
an essential means of building system trust. Meanwhile, as
our case studies demonstrate, distrust by citizens in the
form of protest, investment holdbacks, or technology
refusal may even provide learning opportunities. Since
every act of trust holds a risk [21, 73] and since the
German ES suffers many flaws, setbacks, and risks dur-
ing the transformation, choosing to balance trust and
distrust may be the better option on the road toward
sustainability.
From a functional perspective, it is inevitable that we
attribute trust, in order to reduce complexity, to make
selections, and to build up actionability, for no one can
distrust everything simultaneously. The framework of a
trust architecture highlights prominent trustees in the
social environment, so that selections are limited to
certain potential addressees. This leads to various re-
configurations of trust and distrust, action and counter-
action, affirmation, negation, apathy, etc. According to
Luhmann [47], one can direct expectations at persons
(e.g., opinion leaders), roles (e.g., engineers), programs
(e.g., energy transformation policy), and values (e.g., data
privacy, sustainability). Within the framework for the ES
evolution, these addressees of trust and distrust will deter-
mine the success and failure of smart grids. At this point,
we cannot present methods for managing the systemic
consequences of trust, distrust, and confidence; we have
to settle for demonstrating their status as solutions to
socio-technical problems of ES transformation.
Conclusion
Concepts of trust, distrust, and confidence offer valuable
insights into the relations of various actors of the socio-
technical ES. With these insights, we can challenge some
assumptions of technological visions. Technical innovation
and institutional change cannot, alone, guarantee active
participation by the public. Given that familiar structures
and institutions of the ES are changing, we need to ascer-
tain a future architecture of trust which offers all partici-
pants certain addressees for their attribution of trust. The
authors aim at conducting further empirical research to in-
vestigate processes of trust and distrust attribution.
Endnotes
1The debate concerns not only the provision of
electricity but also broader infrastructures, including
technologies for heating and cooling and technologies
using various energy sources such as gas. However,
in the following, we concentrate on the transform-
ation of the electricity domain, because not only do
we find the most drastic changes in this area but also
many innovations of exploiting various energy car-
riers align to the electricity system, like geothermal
electricity.
2Research on the expectations about new smart
technologies is sometimes misleading [74]; similarly,
rationally calculating cost and benefits is also prone
to lead to mistakes.
3Discussions about “empowerment” also point in the
direction of the capacity to act [75, 76].
4In Germany, such “associations” are often comparable
to American non-profit organizations.
5Likewise, Ashby [77] characterizes machines as
“law-abiding,” because no machine can be called
“self-organizing,” as it cannot automatically change its
way of organization.
6Normal Accident Theory shows how non-linear
operations in tightly coupled structures inevitably lead
to failures and accidents and therefore to negative
surprises [78].
7Data from our interview with a representative of a
German energy business association.
8This assumption was strongly corroborated at a smart
grid congress in Karlsruhe, Germany, in 2014, where a
central message was “the client as [a] central future
asset” [79].
9Examples of low-risk reflection include interaction with
cell phones, public transport, and cars.
10The consequences of a “crisis of trust” can be more
severe for the actionability of specific organizations than
for consumers: “For some [organizations], the crisis of
trust is especially acute, coloring and constraining virtually
all their actions and choices” [80].
11See, for example, Felicity Barringer: “New Electricity
Meters Stir Fears.” The New York Times, 30.01.2011, or
initiatives like www.stopsmartmeters.org.
12See Hughes D’ Arcy: “Biofuel scepticism prompts
German summit.” The Guardian, Accessed 07.03.2011.
13See Qiang Zhang: “Distrust of Chinese milk persists
despite Fonterra case.” BBC News China, 13.08.2015
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-23582282;
accessed 16.02.2015).
14Siting relates to processes surrounding decision-making
about the regional and local spaces and corridors to be used
for infrastructure installations. NIMBY opposition can be a
reaction to it.
15See [1, 2, 57, 81].
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16See “Dokumentation des Dialogprozesses vor der
Antragsstellung.” TenneT TSO GmbH (http://suedlink.
tennet.eu/bundesfachplanung/antrag-6/dialogprozess.html;
accessed 05.02.2015).
17See Nicolai Kwasniewski: “Gleichstromtrasse Suedlink:
Planung und Verlauf der Stromautobahn.” Spiegel Online,
05.02.2014.
18See Markus Szymanski, Mike Balser, and Marlene
Weiß: “Der Stress mit den Stromtrassen”; sueddeutsche.de,
30.07.2014.
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